I’ve been a trader and investor for 44 years. I left Wall Street long ago—-once I understood that their obsolete advice is designed to profit them, not you.
Today, my firm manages around $4 billion in ETFs, and I don’t answer to anybody. I tell the truth because trying to fool investors doesn’t help them, or me.
In Daily H.E.A.T. , I show you how to Hedge against disaster, find your Edge, exploit Asymmetric opportunities, and ride major Themes before Wall Street catches on.
Table of Contents
The Short Clock Is Geopolitical. The Long Clock Is Disclosure. Both Are Ticking.
Most defense funds only make sense while the war is on. UFOD is built around two separate reasons to own it; near-term defense spending and a multi-year push in Congress around Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.
We've put them together in a
single portfolio. See the UFOD holdings: thetruthisoutthereufod.com
Distributor: Foreside Fund Services | Investing involves risk including possible loss of principle.
H.E.A.T.
Private credit didn’t replace the banks. It replaced transparency. Now the bill is coming due — and it won’t arrive with a warning label.
Yesterday, Jerome Powell told an audience that private credit problems are not having a broad impact and doesn’t see the issue spreading to banks. Remember, these are the same guys who thought inflation was transitory. Better to be prepared just in case……
THE GOSPEL: THE GREAT DISINTERMEDIATION
Wall Street loves a clean story. For the last decade, the story was: banks got handcuffed by Dodd-Frank… private credit stepped in… problem solved. And it worked — right up until the moment it didn’t.
Private credit grew from roughly $400 billion in AUM in 2012 to over $1.7 trillion by 2024 (Preqin). Firms like Ares, Apollo, and Blue Owl became the new kings of corporate lending. Spreads were fat. Defaults were minimal. Institutional money poured in from pension funds, endowments, and insurance companies who wanted income without the volatility of public markets.
But private credit didn’t just become a new lender. It became a new system: private funds making floating-rate loans to leveraged companies, financed by structures most investors never examine, valued by models that don’t face a daily market price, and sold to institutions promised “steady income” in exchange for giving up liquidity. That trade is now entering its stress test.
| “You won’t see the stress in real time. You’ll see it late — after the exits narrow.” — Senior Credit Analyst, major U.S. insurance company |
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THE CRACK IN THE GOSPEL: THREE CLOCKS ARE TICKING
The uncomfortable truth about private credit is that its biggest feature — no daily price, no public mark — is also its most dangerous characteristic in a stress cycle. Problems don’t surface slowly. They surface all at once, when liquidity is already gone. Three clocks are ticking simultaneously. Most investors are only watching one.
CLOCK 1 — THE RATE CLOCK ▸ Private credit is overwhelmingly floating-rate. That was a feature when money was free. When the Fed moved rates from 0.25% to 5.5%, the average all-in cost for a middle-market borrower went from ~6% to over 12%. ▸ For a company carrying $200M in debt against $50M in EBITDA, that’s not inconvenient — it’s existential. The math shifts: “we can service this” → “we’ll amend and extend” → “we’ll pay interest with IOUs.” ▸ That last step is Payment-in-Kind (PIK) — and PIK isn’t “everything’s fine.” It means cash is tight enough that the lender accepted more debt as payment. That’s not a default. But it’s a tell. LCD/PitchBook data shows PIK usage in direct lending rose sharply in 2023–2024. |
CLOCK 2 — THE REFI CLOCK ▸ A massive slug of leveraged corporate America is living on borrowed time — literally. Deals written in a zero-rate world must refinance in a 5%+ world. ▸ The Mortgage Bankers Association estimates roughly $900 billion in commercial real estate loans alone come due between 2024 and 2026. That is not a metaphor. It is a scheduled event on a calendar. ▸ If a borrower can’t refinance, the lender gets forced into a workout. And workouts are where “safe income” goes to die — because the loan stops acting like an income product and starts acting like a negotiation. |
CLOCK 3 — THE LIQUIDITY CLOCK ▸ Private credit is sold as stable because there’s no minute-by-minute price quote. But that stability is often an illusion built on mark-to-model pricing and quarterly marks. Managers grade their own homework. ▸ When liquidity is truly tested, only three outcomes exist: gates (redemptions restricted), discounted secondary sales (the real price finally shows up), or borrowing against the portfolio — drawing on warehouse lines and subscription facilities extended by banks. ▸ And that’s the punchline. Banks didn’t go away. They became the plumbing. Regional and mid-sized banks provide the infrastructure financing for the private credit ecosystem: subscription lines, warehouse lines, fund-level facilities. When those portfolios strain, it shows up as haircuts, tighter terms, facility pulls — and suddenly a “safe” credit product needs liquidity right now. |
$1.7T Private Credit AUM (2024) Preqin | 12%+ Avg. middle-market all-in rate LCD / PitchBook | $900B CRE loans maturing 2024–2026 Mortgage Bankers Assoc. | 4.5% Spec. grade default rate (TTM) Moody’s, late 2024 |
THE MECHANISM: HOW THE FEEDBACK LOOP WORKS
Here’s the part most investors miss entirely. The three clocks don’t tick independently. They feed each other.
Private credit stress → PIK toggles rise → BDC net asset values quietly decline → redemption pressure builds → warehouse line draws hit regional bank balance sheets → banks tighten credit to local businesses → more borrowers miss payments → more private credit defaults. Nobody designed this loop. But everyone is inside it.
The regional bank exposure is real and direct on two fronts. First, they are the fund infrastructure — the subscription lines and warehouse facilities that keep private credit vehicles liquid. Second, and more visibly, they carry enormous concentrations of commercial real estate loans originated in a zero-rate world. Office vacancy rates nationally exceed 19% — the highest since the S&L crisis of the early 1990s. The collateral has repriced. The loans haven’t been marked to reflect it. Yet.
Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse in March 2023 was the first tremor. It was idiosyncratic in its specific structure but systemic in its lesson: duration mismatch and concentration risk in a rising-rate environment finds regional banks before it finds anyone else. The FDIC’s own data showed unrealized losses across the banking sector exceeding $500 billion at the peak of the rate cycle. Most of that pain sits at institutions you have never heard of.
⚠️ CASE STUDY: New York Community Bancorp (NYCB) NYCB became the poster child for regional bank stress in 2024 — a living, breathing demonstration of how CRE concentration, rate timing, and acquisition integration can combine into a near-death experience. • Cut its dividend 70% in January 2024 after surprise Q4 2023 losses tied to CRE loan provisions • Stock fell over 60% in days; required a $1 billion emergency capital injection led by former Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin • Held $19B+ in multifamily and commercial real estate loans, many originated when cap rates were 3-4% in a world that had moved to 6-7% • The rescue stabilized the institution — but the episode is a template, not an anomaly. Dozens of regional balance sheets share its architecture. |
⚡ THE TRIPWIRE The market won’t wake up to this story because someone writes a smart memo. It wakes up when one of these four events fires: 1. A major vehicle gates redemptions. — The credibility-destroying event the industry fears most. One high-profile gate triggers industry-wide withdrawal pressure. 2. A large BDC reports a surprise NAV drop or non-accrual spike. — BDCs are the only public window into private credit marks. A bad quarter is a flare gun. 3. A ‘can’t-miss’ borrower can’t refinance and the lender takes equity. — This is when extend-and-pretend officially ends and loss recognition begins. 4. A bank quietly discloses it tightened or pulled a fund facility. — When the plumbing backs up, it shows here first — in the footnotes of a 10-Q. |
INVESTMENT POSITIONING MAP
THE FEE MACHINE: WHY ARES, APOLLO & BLUE OWL WIN IN A STORM These firms are not lenders. They are toll collectors. The distinction is everything. • The toll never stops. Management fees are charged on committed capital — not on performance. Ares earns roughly 1.0–1.5% annually on ~$450B in AUM. That prints $4–6B per year before a single loan performs or defaults. The fee clock doesn’t stop because a borrower misses a payment. • Stress is a growth event for them. When smaller private credit shops blow up, their LP relationships and deal pipelines flow to the survivors. Apollo and Ares both grew AUM through 2008–2009. This is not a coincidence — it is the business model. They are the last shop standing in every cycle. • Permanent capital eliminates the run risk. Blue Owl’s architecture is built around capital that cannot be redeemed on 90-day notice. That’s the structural moat that separates a manager from a hedge fund when panic sets in. You can’t have a run on a bank that doesn’t take deposits. • Distress generates new mandates. Rescue financing, restructuring advisory, distressed-for-control plays — every one of those generates fees. The casino always wins. The only question is which casino. The caveat: if a flagship fund managed by one of these firms gates or books a high-profile blowup, the reputational damage is real and the regulatory clock starts ticking. Own the strongest balance sheets. Don’t confuse “best positioned” with “immune.” |
WINNERS — THE TOLL COLLECTORS | ||||
Company / Ticker | Tier | Why They Win / Lose | Catalyst | Risk |
Ares Management (ARES) | ★★★ | Fee machine on $450B+ AUM at 1–1.5%/yr — prints revenue whether loans perform or not. Consolidation magnet when weaker shops fail. | Smaller shop blowups accelerate LP consolidation to Ares; rate cuts unlock a refi advisory wave | Flagship fund blowup triggers reputational damage and regulatory risk |
Apollo Global (APO) | ★★★ | Athene insurance arm = near-captive $300B+ in permanent capital. Fee income is virtually annuity-like. Thrives in restructuring cycles. | Yield-starved insurers have no alternative; distress creates new restructuring mandates | Complexity draws regulatory scrutiny; Athene concentration is a single point of failure |
Blue Owl Capital (OWL) | ★★★ | 100% permanent capital model — zero redemption run risk. GP stakes business collects fees from other managers’ AUM too. Double-dip fee structure. | Insurance capital partnerships; GP stakes portfolio grows regardless of credit cycle | Tech/software middle market concentration; less diversified than Ares or Apollo |
Golub Capital BDC (GBDC) | ★★ | Most conservatively run large BDC. Lower leverage, tighter underwriting, strong sponsor relationships. Best-in-class for BDC structure. | Rate stabilization clarifies NAV; flight-to-quality within BDC sector benefits Golub | BDC structure still marks to market quarterly; PIK toggle exposure exists even here |
PRESSURE POINTS — MARGIN & TIMING RISK | ||||
Company / Ticker | Tier | Why They Win / Lose | Catalyst | Risk |
CRE-Heavy Regional Banks | ★ | The $900B refinancing wall 2024–2026 forces loss recognition on a schedule. Collateral was underwritten at 3-4% cap rates in a 6-7% world. | Sustained rate cuts + CRE stabilization needed simultaneously — a narrow path | NYCB was a template, not an anomaly. Multiple similar balance sheets exist nationwide. |
High-PIK / High-Leverage BDCs | ★ | Niche sponsor networks may survive if defaults stay contained — a large if | Sector re-rating possible if credit cycle proves benign and rates fall fast | Mark-to-model portfolios mask real distress. PIK toggle surge is the tell. Read the footnotes. |
Highly Levered MM Borrowers | ★ | No investment thesis justifies 8–10x leverage at 12%+ floating rates. Avoid entirely. | Only a restructuring, maturity extension, or debt-for-equity swap | This is the epicenter. Cash flow cannot service current debt loads at current rates. |
Note on Pressure Points: These are not business-failure calls. They reflect margin compression, timing uncertainty, and credit cycle exposure. The risk is duration and repricing — not extinction.
WHAT TO WATCH EVERY WEEK — THE STRESS SCOREBOARD Stop watching the headlines. Watch the plumbing. These five signals will tell you where we are in the cycle before the headlines do: PIK Usage ▸ Rising PIK adoption = rising cash stress. This is the canary. Watch LCD/PitchBook direct lending reports monthly. Non-Accruals ▸ The first place extend-and-pretend breaks down. Track BDC earnings reports — non-accrual rate as % of portfolio. BDC NAV Trends ▸ The only public window into private marks. A quiet NAV decline quarter-over-quarter is a flare gun, not a footnote. Facility Tightening ▸ Any bank disclosing it reduced or tightened warehouse/subscription lines to credit funds. This is where the feedback loop shows up first. Refi Failures ▸ Watch for “amend-and-extend” announcements in leveraged credit. This is the soft default wave before the hard default wave. |
🚨 WHAT WOULD BREAK THIS THESIS • Rates stay “higher for longer” well into 2026. Every quarter without cuts is another quarter of PIK toggles converting to actual losses. The math eventually breaks. • A major BDC or credit vehicle gates redemptions. One high-profile gate triggers industry-wide withdrawal pressure and a forced mark-to-reality event across the sector. • CRE losses accelerate beyond current FDIC reserve buffers, requiring another round of emergency capital raises — or FDIC-assisted acquisitions at regional banks. • Congressional investigation or new regulatory framework for private credit (Dodd-Frank for shadow banking) compresses multiples across the entire alt asset management sector. • The feedback loop — private credit stress → warehouse line draws → regional bank tightening → more defaults — moves faster than policymakers who insist the risk is “contained.” |
5 KEY TAKEAWAYS
1. There are three clocks ticking, not one.
The Rate Clock, the Refi Clock, and the Liquidity Clock are running simultaneously and they feed each other. Most analysts are only watching credit spreads. Watch the plumbing instead.
2. The opacity is the risk, not just a feature.
Mark-to-model pricing, quarterly marks, and PIK toggles mean private credit stress surfaces late — all at once, when liquidity is already gone. BDC NAV trends and non-accrual rates are your early warning system.
3. Regional banks are the transmission mechanism.
They didn’t disappear from corporate credit — they became its plumbing. Warehouse lines, subscription facilities, and CRE concentrations make them the first place private credit stress becomes a real-economy problem.
4. The alt managers win because they collect the toll, not the loan.
Ares, Apollo, and Blue Owl earn management fees on committed AUM whether loans perform or not. In a default cycle they get bigger, not smaller — consolidating LP relationships and mandates from failed competitors. Own the casino, not the gambler.
5. The opportunity is consolidation, not collapse.
This cycle ends the same way the S&L crisis ended: not with the death of the system, but with the death of 1,000 weak players and the enrichment of 50 strong ones. The window to buy the survivors cheaply is before the Tripwire fires — not after.
News vs. Noise: What’s Moving Markets Today
A lot happened yesterday for a day when the S&P 500 wasn’t down much. First you had the speaker of Iran’s parliament telling you to sell the morning pop, and he was right. More importantly you saw a massive selloff in the only two areas of strength in tech—-memory and optics.
MU went from blowout earnings to a clear short sale…..
COHR also broke below the 50 day. I did it once before during this rally and quickly came back. Will see if it does it again…..
This article was making the rounds on Wall Street, I’ll probably talk about it in tomorrow’s newsletter……
So far this morning the market is trying to rally again, but the memory and optics names aren’t budging (it’s way early though). Looks like there’s a story that Trump is ok ending the war without opening the Straits of Hormuz.
While the semi’s got wrecked, some of the software names where the only green in tech. You had a few banks put out notes about how AI will increase the need for cybersecurity and a story that the CEO of PANW bought a ton of his own stock. The last time it looked like software names had bottomed they gave a meaningful, yet brief, upside move. On a name like CRWD I’d be watching the 50 day moving average….
Dumb article of the day…..
Utilities aren’t the same type of stocks my grandmother used to invest in. They are completely tied to AI and the data center buildout without the upside of the technology names. Far from defensive.
ETF News
MEMY Holdings Update:
We replaced $COHR ( ▲ 8.45% ) $ALM ( ▲ 5.16% ) $WDC ( ▲ 7.48% ) $TER ( ▲ 7.28% ) $AMAT ( ▲ 5.78% ) and $CRSP ( ▲ 7.29% ). We added $CRWD ( ▲ 2.72% ) $LLY ( ▲ 3.74% ) $TTD ( ▲ 3.09% ) $BRZE ( ▲ 0.51% ) $UBER ( ▲ 2.89% ) $WPM ( ▲ 6.08% ) All 5% positions.
For a full list of MEMY holdings, visit:
https://incomeblastetfs.com/etf/memy
Distributor: Foreside Fund Services, LLC
A Stock I’m Watching
Today’s stock is Nucor (NUE)…..
Lot of interesting lows for undercut and rally moves and clear support at 155. No secret I like metals here also.
In Case You Missed It
I had the pleasure of talking to Dividend Degenerates on why I like put spreads better than covered calls for income…..
The H.E.A.T. (Hedge, Edge, Asymmetry and Theme) Formula is designed to empower investors to spot opportunities, think independently, make smarter (often contrarian) moves, and build real wealth.
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